Daf 5a
תּוֹדָה תּוֹכִיחַ
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר
עוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ וְחָזַר הַדִּין לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁירִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה
מָה לִשְׁלָמִים שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנִין נְסָכִין וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק
שְׁלָמִים יוֹכִיחוּ
לָא יָדַע בְּמַאי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לִיפַּסְלוּ כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ
רְמֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ עַל מְעוֹהִי בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא וּמַקְשֵׁי אִם כְּשֵׁרִים הֵם יְרַצּוּ וְאִם אֵין מְרַצִּין לָמָּה בָּאִין
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי (אֱלִיעֶזֶר) [אֶלְעָזָר] מָצִינוּ בְּבָאִין לְאַחַר מִיתָה שֶׁהֵן כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין דִּתְנַן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהֵבִיאָה חַטָּאתָהּ וּמֵתָה יָבִיאוּ יוֹרְשִׁין עוֹלָתָהּ עוֹלָתָהּ וּמֵתָה לֹא יָבִיאוּ יוֹרְשִׁין חַטָּאתָהּ
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ בְּעוֹלָה דְּאָתְיָא לְאַחַר מִיתָה אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה מְנָלַן
אֲמַר לֵיהּ הֲרֵי מַחְלוֹקְתְּךָ בְּצִידּוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר אַף הָאָשָׁם
אָמַר זֶהוּ שֶׁאוֹמְרִין עָלָיו אָדָם גָּדוֹל הוּא קָאָמֵינָא אֲנָא מִשְׁנָה שְׁלֵימָה וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר
אֶלָּא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אֶפְתַּח אֲנָא פִּתְחָא לְנַפְשַׁאי מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ וְגוֹ' הַאי נְדָבָה נֶדֶר הוּא כּוּ' כְּדִלְעֵיל
יָתֵיב רַבִּי זֵירָא וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא וְיָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי גַּבַּיְיהוּ וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה וְנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ אֵימָא הַבָּא בְּנֶדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה לֵייתֵי וְלָא לִירַצֵּי אָשָׁם לָא לֵייתֵי כְּלָל
אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מֵהָכָא פְּתַח וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת אוֹתָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה הָא שְׁאָר קֳדָשִׁים שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִין יָכוֹל יְרַצּוּ תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ
וְאֵימָא הַבָּא בְּנֶדֶר וּנְדָבָה לֵייתֵי וְלָא לִירַצֵּי אָשָׁם (נָמֵי) אַרְצוֹיֵי נָמֵי לִירַצֵּי
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי אָשָׁם דְּמִירַצֵּי לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְכַפֶּרֶת אֵינָהּ מְרַצָּה אָשָׁם שֶׁמְּכַפֵּר אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה
מָה לְעוֹלָה שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל
I do not know to what this refers, (1) therefore the Divine Law wrote ‘this is the law’, etc. While if the Divine Law wrote ‘this is the law’ [only], I would say that they become invalid; (2) therefore the Divine Law wrote, ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’, etc. Resh Lakish lay face downward (3) in the Beth Hamidrash, and raised a difficulty: If they are valid, let them be accepted;4 while if they are not accepted, (5) for what purpose do they come? (6) — Said R. Eleazar to him: We find that those [sacrifices] which come after the death [of their owners] are valid, yet they are not accepted. (7) For we learnt: If a woman brought her sin-offering [after childbirth] and then died, her heirs must bring her burnt-offering; [if she brought] her burnt-offering, her heirs do not bring her sin-offering. (8) I agree in the case of a burnt-offering, (9) he replied, since it comes after death;10 but in the case of a guiltoffering which does not come after death, (11) whence do we know [that it is valid]? (12) — He replied, Lo, [support to] your contention is [available] close at hand: R. ELIEZER SAYS, ALSO THE GUILTOFFERING [IS INVALID]. (13) Thereupon he exclaimed: Is this he who is spoken of as a great man? I speak to you of an explicit Mishnah, and you answer me with R. Eliezer's view! (14) Rather, said Resh Lakish: I will find a solution myself: ‘That which is gone out of thy lips etc:’ is this a freewilloffering — surely it is a vow,15, etc. as above. (16) R. Zera and R. Isaac b. Abba were sitting, and Abaye sat with them. They sat and debated: Resh Lakish had a difficulty about the guilt-offering, which does not come after death, and he adduced an exegesis on ‘that which goeth out of thy lips’. Yet say, That which may come as a vow or as a freewilloffering must be brought (17) but do not propitiate, (18) but a guilt-offering is not to be brought at all? (19) Said Abaye to them: Resh Lakish solved [the difficulty] from the following text: And he shall kill it for a sinoffering: (20) only it [when slaughtered] in its own name is valid and [when slaughtered] not it its own name is invalid; (21) but other sacrifices [slaughtered] not in their own name are valid. You might think then that they are ‘accepted’. Therefore it states, ‘that which goeth out of thy lips’. (22) Then say, That which comes as a vow or a freewill-offering must be brought but is not ‘accepted’, whereas a guiltoffering is even ‘accepted’ too? (23) — Said Abaye: You cannot maintain that a guilt-offering is [in such circumstances] accepted, [as the reverse follows] from a burnt-offering, a fortiori: if a burnt-offering, whose purpose is not to make atonement, is not ‘accepted, (24) then how much more is a guilt-offering, whose purpose is to make atonement, not ‘accepted’. As for a burntoffering [you might argue] ‘the reason [that it is not ‘accepted’] is because it is altogether burnt! Then let peace-offerings prove it. (25) As for peace-offerings, [you might argue] [they are not ‘accepted’] because they require libations and the waving of the breast and shoulder, Then let a burnt-offering prove it. (26) And thus the argument revolves: the characteristic of the former is not that of the latter and the characteristic of the latter is not that of the former. The factor common to both is that they are holy [sacrifices] ‘and if slaughtered not in their own names they are valid, yet not ‘accepted’, so also do I adduce the guilt-offering which is holy, hence if one slaughters it not in its name it is valid and not accepted. [No:] The factor common to both [it may be argued] is that they are [also] brought as public offerings! (27) — Then let the thanksgiving-offering prove it, (28)
(1). ↑ I would not know that Scripture refers at all to the offering of a sacrifice for a purpose other than its own.
(2). ↑ If not offered for their own sake.
(3). ↑ Lit.’ on his stomach.’ He was very stout, v. Git. 47a.
(4). ↑ I.e., let their owners be regarded as having fulfilled their obligations.
(5). ↑ If they do not acquit their owners.
(6). ↑ Why are they valid? At this stage he did not know that their validity is deduced from Scripture.
(7). ↑ I.e., they do not propitiate.
(8). ↑ Because in the latter case, it is a sin-offering whose owner died (the passage treats of the case where she dedicated both animals before her death) before it was offered, and it is a traditional law that such is not sacrificed but left to die. — Yet the burnt-offering is offered, though no propitiation is required on behalf of a dead woman. The present case is similar.
(9). ↑ That even if it is killed for a different purpose, it must still be offered (i.e., the remaining rites must be carried out).
(10). ↑ The same therefore applies to peace-offerings and other sacrifices which come after death.
(11). ↑ A guilt-offering is not brought after the death of the owner, but is left to pasture.
(12). ↑ Since the Tanna of the Mishnah mentions as exceptions only the paschal-offering and sinoffering.
(13). ↑ Sc. it is invalid presumably because it does not come after death.
(14). ↑ My difficulty concerns the law stated anonymously in the Mishnah, which presumably is authoritative, and it is not enough to answer me that according to R. Eliezer there is no difficulty.
(15). ↑ Resh Lakish had not known of this when he raised the difficulty, and arrived at this exegesis independently.
(16). ↑ Supra p. 2.
(17). ↑ I.e. if slaughtered not in its own name, the other sacrificial rites in, connection with it must be performed.
(18). ↑ I.e., the vow is not thereby fulfilled, since it was not brought in its proper name.
(19). ↑ The sacrifice in such circumstances being considered invalid.
(20). ↑ Lev. IV, 33.
(21). ↑ Altogether, and therefore we cannot proceed with the remaining rites.
(22). ↑ Teaching that it does not propitiate as the offering for which it was originally intended.
(23). ↑ So that another sacrifice is not required.
(24). ↑ If slaughtered not under its own name.
(25). ↑ Which are not altogether burnt, yet are not ‘accepted’.
(26). ↑ Which does not require these.
(27). ↑ The daily burnt-offering and the lambs of peace-offerings offered on Pentecost were public offerings. But no guilt-offering was ever a public offering.
(28). ↑ Which was likewise never a public offering, yet conformed to the same law as the others,
(1). ↑ I would not know that Scripture refers at all to the offering of a sacrifice for a purpose other than its own.
(2). ↑ If not offered for their own sake.
(3). ↑ Lit.’ on his stomach.’ He was very stout, v. Git. 47a.
(4). ↑ I.e., let their owners be regarded as having fulfilled their obligations.
(5). ↑ If they do not acquit their owners.
(6). ↑ Why are they valid? At this stage he did not know that their validity is deduced from Scripture.
(7). ↑ I.e., they do not propitiate.
(8). ↑ Because in the latter case, it is a sin-offering whose owner died (the passage treats of the case where she dedicated both animals before her death) before it was offered, and it is a traditional law that such is not sacrificed but left to die. — Yet the burnt-offering is offered, though no propitiation is required on behalf of a dead woman. The present case is similar.
(9). ↑ That even if it is killed for a different purpose, it must still be offered (i.e., the remaining rites must be carried out).
(10). ↑ The same therefore applies to peace-offerings and other sacrifices which come after death.
(11). ↑ A guilt-offering is not brought after the death of the owner, but is left to pasture.
(12). ↑ Since the Tanna of the Mishnah mentions as exceptions only the paschal-offering and sinoffering.
(13). ↑ Sc. it is invalid presumably because it does not come after death.
(14). ↑ My difficulty concerns the law stated anonymously in the Mishnah, which presumably is authoritative, and it is not enough to answer me that according to R. Eliezer there is no difficulty.
(15). ↑ Resh Lakish had not known of this when he raised the difficulty, and arrived at this exegesis independently.
(16). ↑ Supra p. 2.
(17). ↑ I.e. if slaughtered not in its own name, the other sacrificial rites in, connection with it must be performed.
(18). ↑ I.e., the vow is not thereby fulfilled, since it was not brought in its proper name.
(19). ↑ The sacrifice in such circumstances being considered invalid.
(20). ↑ Lev. IV, 33.
(21). ↑ Altogether, and therefore we cannot proceed with the remaining rites.
(22). ↑ Teaching that it does not propitiate as the offering for which it was originally intended.
(23). ↑ So that another sacrifice is not required.
(24). ↑ If slaughtered not under its own name.
(25). ↑ Which are not altogether burnt, yet are not ‘accepted’.
(26). ↑ Which does not require these.
(27). ↑ The daily burnt-offering and the lambs of peace-offerings offered on Pentecost were public offerings. But no guilt-offering was ever a public offering.
(28). ↑ Which was likewise never a public offering, yet conformed to the same law as the others,
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